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bstract:  The European view of economic competition, which is the 
European Parliament view and enforced by the European Commission 
does not have a coherent theory of efficiency in allocating resources and 
justice on a market. The positive law proceeds at incriminating and penalizing 
with arbitrarily fixed fines the players on different markets but not offering a 
definition of what competition or free market means, not to mention a theory of 
the firm. It delivers, of course, a sort of theory, but we argue that it is not 
coherent and moreover, pretends to be what it cannot possible be, namely free 
of any value judgments. The present paper exposes an alternative view to the 
theory used by EC when decided to fine with 1.4 billion euros the European car 
glass suppliers Saint-Gobain, Pilkington, AGC and Soliver for cartelizing, and it 
also presents the case from the perspective of free competition theory based on 
private property rights of owners.  
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Introduction 
The differences between neoclassical or mainstream competition theory and the 
free competition theory became more and more obvious. Especially when we read 
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about European Commission (hereinafter EC) interventions in various cases of 
monopolies or cartels. At European level, the market is viewed as a sum of 
competitors which offer products and services to the consumers, but which can 
abuse by their power, thus creating welfare losses either to consumer or to 
competitors, but also to a vague entity namely the society. Of course, a first 
fundamental question which we can raise is who gave them that power? Is there a 
sort of natural ability of the entrepreneur to become extremely powerful or to 
permanently abuse by its privileged position on the market? The economic science 
teaches us quite different things. We believe that any abuse must be based on a 
theory of the aggressor, the aggressed and what is to be aggressed. The neo-
classical competition theory fails to pay attention to such a theory. It fails because it 
insists on a certain view of the market (perfect competition model) which removes 
from entrepreneurs any incentive to act. (Mises, 1966, pp. 105)  There is no secret 
anymore that the perfect competition model became the role model for competition 
public policies of the governments around the world (Blaug, 1992, pp.166). 
Fortunately, its idealistic and inconsistent assumptions do not correspond with the 
reality that we live in. (Armentano, 1999a, pp.18) It is not the purpose of the present 
analysis to restate all the differences between economic science and neoclassicism. 
Other authors have done this in a respectable manner (Hulsmann, 1999).  
This paper makes a short inquiry in the case of the European car glass cartel in 
order to provide an alternative view of the market to the mainstream one. This is 
the free competition theory based on private property rights approach, where any 
individual or company can enter the production or selling of anything as long as it 
does not invade in an objective or visible way the property of others. (Rothbard, 
2004a, pp. 654) First we will present a brief history of the case (which started in 
2005 and culminated in 2008 with the fine imposed on the four leaders in car 
glass industry, Saint-Gobain, AGC, Pilkington and Soliver). In the second part, 
the paper presents some organizing details of the cartel and EC motivations for 
imposing the fine, and the third part comes with a critique of EC actions from the 
perspective of free competition theory. 
A short history of the car glass cartel 
According to EC the inquiries started in February, 20051, after a notice of a 
German lawyer (who sent a letter on October 7, 2003), the assignee of a client 
who remained anonymous during the inquiry. It is believed that the letter may 
have contained charges regarding companies specialized in the production of 
car glass that would be cartelized, exchanging “sensitive” information about 
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prices and market shares, with the purport of implementing “certain agreements 
and concerted actions”. Thus, taking into consideration the mechanism which 
delivers car glass to car manufacturers who organize auctions where every glass 
producer comes with its own offer, EC concluded with absolute certainty, that 
this cartel forced the car manufacturers to accept prices which were secretly set 
before the auction and that the final consumers of cars suffered because of this a 
loss in welfare. Cartels, along with monopolies, oligopolies, secret agreements 
and state aids are penalized by the European competition legislation because 
each of them can cause welfare losses and a decrease in the efficiency of 
resource allocation at a European level. These negative effects do not 
correspond to the EC strategy which aims at creating a unique European 
competitive market granting consumers freedom to choose between various 
products1.  
The inquiries were held at the headquarters of the 4 top big  car glass producers, 
the Compaigne of Saint Gobain (CSG), Pilkington, AGC and Soliver, in Belgium, 
Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. During 2006, EC will send to these 
companies a request for information under Article 18 of Regulation no.1/2003
2, 
and on April 18, 2007 EC adopts a statement of objections (SO) based on 
information gathered. After consultation of the SO, Glaverbel and AGC request 
for leniency. This is a formal action permitted by the EC whenever a party 
involved in specific economic crimes decides to plead guilty first. The leniency 
application also provides reduction in fines for the first criminal who gets out of 
the cartel and confesses. But EC refused to apply leniency for the two 
companies, because they didn’t comply with the official requirements of leniency 
program
3.  
On November 12, 2008, after a decision of more than 200 pages, EC decides to 
impose 1.4 billion euros fine which inter alia is the highest fine ever imposed in 
the history of European cartels. The decision contains information about the 
European auto glass market and the main competitors with their turnover, about 
how the cartel was organized and its duration (this information can be found in 
the Facts chapter). Also, the decision contains information regarding the legality 
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of the cartel’s actions in the light of the legal provisions which underlie the 
competition policy in the European Union and about imposing fines (these can 
be read at the Legal provisions chapter). 
Cartel’s organizing actions and EC motivation 
in regard to the decision to fine it 
According to the EC, evidences concerning the existence of a cartel between 
European leaders in auto glass dates from 1998 and ends in 2003. In this period 
of time, as it is mentioned in the EC decision, there were certain bilateral and 
trilateral meetings between the companies, having as purpose “in particular the 
evaluation and monitoring of market shares, the allocation of car glass supplies 
to car manufacturers, the exchange of price information as well as other 
commercially sensitive information and the coordination of their respective 
pricing and supply strategies
1”. The decision offers information with respect to 
the location of meetings, and also their frequency and content. EC holds proofs 
which attest that car glass suppliers (CSG, Pilkington, AGC and Soliver) were 
setting the winner of the auction before the auction itself, according to the 
comparative advantages between them. Thus, according to EC “sometimes 
certain car glass parts or pieces were better for one supplier based on how much 
free production capacity it had or on low transport costs for instance
2”. Also, 
sometimes, when a car manufacturer wanted to work with a single car glass 
supplier, the companies were telling it that there are no sufficient capacities for it 
to honor the contract, thus forcing the car manufacturer to reorient toward 
another option, which of course was already planned by the cartel. Another 
functioning mechanism of the cartel, considered sophisticated by the EC, 
consisted in planning the winner according to every interest of a certain auction. 
Companies were organizing meetings where they agreed upon ‘covering’ each 
other concerning a minimum price (of the winner) and the highest prices (of the 
others), orienting in this way or forcing, in EC language, the allocation decision of 
car manufacturers. 
The basic motivation of EC for the fine imposed on the car glass suppliers for 
establishing a cartel is the infringement of Article 81 (present 101) of the Treaty 
for Establishing the European Community (TEEC)
3 and Article 53 of the 
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European Economic Area (EEA)
1. Both articles invoked by the EC altogether 
state the same thing, that any decision taken by a company or association 
between companies should be prohibited if it has the effect of “prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition”. The only difference is that they belong to 
treaties which have different purposes. This is the rule of law in the case of 
cartels and it is also the case of this analysis. If CSG, Pilkington, AGC and 
Soliver caused an infringement on Article 81 and Article 53, we know that it was 
concerning their actions which distorted competition on the European car glass 
market. There is no doubt about that. Moreover, the EC decision explains in 
detail the specific actions of the cartel such as “refusing price reductions to car 
manufacturers
2”, “limiting the disclosure of their production costs and other 
technical information
3”, “going beyond their own legitimate market share using 
specific tools to allocate contracts between themselves and..achieving a ‘market 
share freeze’
4”, “claiming vis-à-vis car manufacturers to have a technical problem 
or a shortage of raw material for fine-tuning the market share balance
5” etc. 
These are all infringements of the two Articles and in EC opinion, justify the 1.4 
billion euro fine.  
But by far the most interesting EC point of view regarding cartels in general is 
that it is not necessary for the incriminated companies to have a specific written 
agreement, as an agreement on a certain plan is not even necessary. It is 
sufficient for them to have expressed their common intention to act in a certain 
way on the market. But this cannot constitute a solid ground for a competition 
policy, because otherwise we can literally imagine that any unexpressed and 
unintended intention can be penalized at the political whim. If two companies act 
in the same way on a market but never had a single meeting for purposing this 
action, what has a judge to say about it? Moreover, if we consider the 
anticompetitive effects of cartels, what is the difference between two or more 
companies that cartelized unaware of each other actions and some that 
cartelized being aware and planning at length all cartel’s future actions? Should 
the legislation be enforced in both cases? Or not? If it should be then all EC 
actions to discover the so-called secret agreement are useless since the penalty 
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will be imposed in any event; on the other hand if it should not be, then EC is not 
really concerned with the effects that distort competition, but only to discover and 
penalize those who had the specific intention to harm competitors and 
consumers.  
 
Table 1: Market shares of the main players on the European car glass 
market between 1998-2003 
Year  Saint-
Gobain  Pilkington AGC  Soliver  Guardian  PPG  Others 
Total 
sales 
(bn. 
euros) 
1998  40-50% 30-40%  15-25%  <5%  <5%  5-
10% 
<1% 1-2 
1999  40-50% 30-40%  15-25%  <5%  <5%  <5% <1%  1-2 
2000  40-50% 30-40%  15-25%  <5%  <5%  <5% <1%  2-3 
2001  40-50% 30-40%  15-25%  <5%  <5%  <5% <1%  2-3 
2002  40-50% 30-40%  15-25%  <5%  <5%  <5% <1%  2-3 
2003  40-50% 20-30%  15-25%  <5%  <5%  <5% <1%  2-3 
Source: EC estimations based on interviews with the companies involved in the cartel. 
 
Applying free competition theory 
As we saw, EC will fine any entrepreneur who will infringe on Article 81 and 
Article 53, because to infringe these articles is to have by default an 
anticompetitive conduct. Yet, we believe that we need a more precise definition 
of what EC means by anticompetitive conduct. Normally, the essential feature of 
any entrepreneur motivated by consumer demand and profit is its dynamism. Its 
dynamism is always at the confluence between budget restrictions and the will to 
innovate and capture a bigger part of the consumers. In practice, the 
entrepreneur is guided by its earning capacity, and this can take the form of 
agreement with some other entrepreneurs, in order to decrease the operating 
costs on a specific market. If we accept the entrepreneurial dimension (the only 
one, after all) of the market, themselves we are able to understand its 
competitive and rivalry spirit. Competition and the competitiveness of 
entrepreneurs are elements always determined only by them, because they are 
the only true receivers of the existing needs on the market. Thus, the 
entrepreneurs are in permanent connection with consumers. Entrepreneurial 
movements cannot be designed without those who send the main message:  Free Competition Theory and the secret agreements 
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consumers. So it is at least contradictory, if not mistaken, to speak about the 
anticompetitive conduct of entrepreneurs. It is mistaken at least when arguing 
against entrepreneurs before delivering a coherent theory of entrepreneurial 
activity and consumer on the market.  
But this is happening and the EC is the entity that supports this view. What we 
think it is essential to focus on is on what free competition theory has to say. For 
that purpose we are not interested in legal or moral actions of entrepreneurs, but 
in their economic actions. (Armentano, 1999b, pp. 14) From an economic point 
of view (which is the language for free competition theory) CSG, Pilkington, AGC 
and Soliver can become aggressors – or have an “anticompetitive conduct” – 
only if they infringe on the private property of other competitors, or of the 
consumers of their products. The legitimate private property rights on car glasses 
are the only ethical system which can usefully complete the economic analysis 
(Jora, 2009a). We can also analyze the case from a strictly scientific or value-
free perspective but this will necessarily lead to a non-critical acceptance of any 
competition policy, good or bad, which EC sets forth. The purpose of the present 
analysis is an economic approach to the case based on the system of private 
property rights which is ex definitio an ethical system because it proposes certain 
values at which people should adhere. And the core of this system is the 
theorem of non-aggression, just stated. According to the EC decision to fine the 
cartel, there was no infringement on private property rights of any of the 
entrepreneurs involved. This helps us to conclude that, economically speaking 
the case presents no illegitimate action, thus remaining to identify the ground on 
which their actions were considered illegal.  
EC considers (in the spirit of Article 81 and Article 53) that any entrepreneurial 
practice which “directly or indirectly fixes purchase prices and other commercial 
conditions” and “shares markets or supply sources” can become an 
anticompetitive one, with negative impact on the market and consumers. 
Therefore we reason that by restricting the competition (whatever that means) 
you cause negative effects on the entrepreneurs involved. From this we face two 
problems that we engage to solve. The first is what ethical system employs EC 
for considering the action of restricting competition a criminal one. We have to 
find out this because we know that from inside economic science we are not 
allowed to choose between different grades of economic competition, but only to 
present its effects. And the second problem is to determine the applicability of 
this supposed ethical system in the case of the European car glass cartel, where 
we try to examine if the ethics proposed by the EC is universal or uniform, 
because any ethical principle which is not universal misses its purpose.   Andreas STAMATE 
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The fundamental of any public policy, in our case, of competition public policy, 
must contain considerations that cannot remain value-free. Even the analysis of 
this case cannot be done on the false pretense of value free judgments
1. But this 
is not even necessary. What we intent is to identify, within our own 
methodological constraints, the ethical alternative that EC proposes to the 
system of private property, a universal one. From a scientific point of view, 
economics is useful to determine the effects of the cartel put in practice by Saint-
Gobain, Pilkington, AGC and Soliver, but useless to decree whether the action is 
good or bad. Still, EC identifies the cartel action as bad because it restricts 
competition and goes further to fine the companies engaged in it. Restricting 
competition can cause losses to other competitors even to the limit of 
bankruptcy. Competition is restricted whenever the number of competitors on the 
market decreases and is re-established if new competitors enter the market and 
compete for the same profit margins with the existing competitors. Considering 
this logic, we can argue that the fine itself caused a restriction of competition. 
The 1.4 billion euros, money that will enter the EC budget, will produce 
significant costs of the same value to the companies’ management. Thus, the 
fine will cause a proportional decrease in grade of competition on the European 
car glass market. The punishment has been enforced, it is true and that means 
the cartel was fined. But this action does not exclude the economic 
consequences. And this can be: drastic reduction in investments, price increases 
for some products, dismissal of some people with important entrepreneurial 
merits for the company etc. Thus we conclude that we deal with a preferential (or 
utilitarian) ethics promoted and enforced by EC. This type of ethics stems from a 
fallacious concept of competition and entrepreneurial practice which EC uses. 
EC fines a certain part of the market (composed of car glass suppliers) in the 
benefit (not yet estimated by EC, and maybe not even estimable) of car 
                                                        
1 To examine a cartel case or any other competition issue mentioned by the competition 
law, as economists (which according to modern science means free of value 
judgments) we can do it either by passive and noncritical acceptance of any past 
events produced in the case (a form of simply relating the facts), or by completely 
unaware of any ethical considerations implicitly in any approval or disapproval of a fact, 
or by candid acceptance of the failure or inappropriateness of economic science in 
studying these type of cases and borrowing a science of ethics. The first option is the 
position of an historian, the second is the position of an economist who refuses to be 
aware of its own implicitly ethical position because he is stuck in an almost Taliban and 
self-contradictory wertfreiht and the third is the position of an ethical economist who 
searches for universal solutions to the problems encountered and the one who admits 
that ethics has rational foundations.   Free Competition Theory and the secret agreements 
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manufacturers, the industrial consumers of car glass. The question we raise is 
what criteria EC used for distinguish between the relative importance on the 
market of car manufacturers (“cartel’s victims”) and those of car glass suppliers 
(“cartel organizers”). The importance of one entrepreneurial group over another 
must reflect an ethical option, but this cannot be otherwise than universal or 
applicable to all people. EC does not possess such an ethical option, and the 
simple plea for the supposed advantages that competition brings is not alone 
sufficient. Because, for example, how can we argue remaining strictly 
economists in front of people for whom competition is not desirable or who 
understand the competition process as a war between selfish individual interests 
which always throws out the weaker ones? In that case, it becomes obvious that 
EC is not able to promote competition only by using economic considerations, 
and if adopts an ethical system this cannot be utilitarian because it is not 
universal, but preferential.  
Also, EC proves a partial understanding of the micro economic concept like 
demand and supply when decides to fine car glass suppliers on the ground of 
“secret agreement” which favors them, but causes losses to the consumers. 
According to this unilateral and obtuse logic, the demand side possesses a kind of 
mystical sovereignty over the supply side. However, in the economic realm, there is 
a strictly and assumed dependence between demand factors with their purchase 
power and those of supply, specialized in satisfying needs. The consumer-
producer dependency is kept as long as the former voluntarily uses its purchase 
power for buying producer’s goods, and the latter proceeds also voluntarily in 
delivering those goods. In the free competition theory, a crime occurs whenever 
there is an aggression on private property rights. In other words, economic science 
or its extended version, praxeology, is not concerned with determining the methods 
for satisfying consumers, and also does not assign a special importance to them 
compared with producers and neither does it consider the moral or ethical 
implications of the chosen methods. Economics only states that there are needs 
that by their nature must be fulfilled. From their position, as private owners of 
resources, Saint-Gobain, Pilkington, AGC and Soliver, did not have ex ante any 
economic obligation to satisfy car manufacturer’s needs. We can speak about 
economic and legal obligation only when a transaction is accepted by all parties. 
The fundamental theorem of exchange states very clearly that once accepted a 
transaction is viewed by both consumer and producer as a step forward to a more 
satisfactory state than the previous one, before the transaction. Thus we arrive at 
the following fundamental problem: counterfactually, what would the consumers 
have earned? Or, accepting the hypothesis that reveals the so-called welfare 
losses for car manufacturers and consumers, we ask: Losses compared to what  Andreas STAMATE 
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other possible earnings? Can EC determine which would have been the 
counterfactual earnings? We believe it can’t, taking into consideration the 
theoretical and methodological difficulty of this action, and furthermore the absence 
of clear evidence (at least from official documents concerning the case) of possible 
losses.  
On some economic issues of the case 
As we could see, the fine imposed to Saint-Gobain, Pilkington, AGC and Soliver 
is based on the legal provisions of Article 101 of TEEC and Article 53 of EEA. 
The basic illegal actions in this case can be summed up as follows: allocation of 
contracts between cartel members, maintaining a supposed stability of their 
market share and limitation of information regarding glass supply in the control of 
car manufacturers. What needs to be analyzed in this context is the economic 
effect of the cartel, which EC considers to be anticompetitive. The allocation of 
contracts between cartel members is far from being an anticompetitive practice, 
as long as even EC admits in Note 112 that any agreement between companies 
must be interpreted “in the light of their respective profitability analysis
1” 
(therefore how can we disconnect competition from the essential principle of 
profitability?) and further on Note 117 where EC discovers one of the 
fundamental liberties of free exchange arguing that although contracts had been 
allocated in respect of the personal interests of the cartel members, the practice 
“didn’t always worked because the car manufacturer chose a supplier other than 
the designated one, or because the sales of a given car model was well below 
the expected volume or for other reasons such as single, dual or multi-sourcing 
strategies applied by the car manufacturers
2”. It is very interesting to determine 
in the course of EC objections numerous entrepreneurial actions that are 
completely compatible with economic laws (see Note 106 where it mentions the 
opportunity of allocating contracts which “was made with the purpose of 
allocating and better re-allocating glass pieces between them”, or Note 112, 
which presented what alternative entrepreneurs had to avoid losses “For any 
loss-making parts, the three competitors respectively either needed to stop 
producing these glass parts and switch production to more profitable activities or 
to increase the price of the car glass parts”; also see Note 117 where EC 
comments on the meetings between companies and where “proposed solutions 
were sometimes made to adjust for losses in order to try to ensure stability of 
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their respective market shares”) but paradoxically illegal. Thus, even if these 
actions are considered illegal from the EC perspective, a sort of rational intuition 
confirms their compatibility with the normal economic conduct of an entrepreneur 
(Topan, 2009, Jora, 2009b). And once again it becomes clear why an ethical 
position must be embedded in our analysis.  
EC considers (Note 130) an explicit or written agreement of the parts involved in 
the cartel is not necessary because even the intention can be incriminated. “It 
does not have to be made in writing; no formalities are necessary, and no 
contractual sanctions or enforcement measures are required. The fact of 
agreement may be express or implicit in the behavior of the parties
1” (EC 
Decision, Note 474). But from a liberal point of view, we cannot conceive a legal 
system that proposes to sanction the intention of a people or association of 
people. Any legal system that does not make a clear distinction between 
aggression (requesting the proof of the aggressed property) and non-aggression 
is at least problematic, if not ipso facto a potential aggressor. If we reason by the 
logic of such a system, it follows for example, that the intention of a company to 
decrease technological costs by selecting only the best suppliers in order to 
maintain or increase its market share can be considered an illegal action, 
although there will surely be at least one supplier and one consumer who will 
benefit from this action. How can EC decide between their and other excluded 
suppliers’ importance? And how can this be done remaining strictly value-free?  
Other practical aspects that EC finds unnecessary to discuss in the economy of 
this case (but extremely important – we believe – for a prospect economic 
justification) are those regarding the concrete proofs of the damages caused by 
the cartel (increasing prices for a certain car glass part
2, decreasing the quantity 
                                                        
1 EC decision, pp. 128. 
2 EC holds that car manufacturers were forced to choose a specific higher price 
combination given by the cartelists, who agreed in secret upon it. It is important to mention 
that, even if there had not been any secret agreement between the cartelists, the car 
manufacturers would still had to choose between exactly the same options or same 
competitors (each one fixing its own price) and, that competitors were declaring ex ante 
the winner of the auction the one with the smallest price. Thus, not taking into account the 
fact that car glass suppliers could not increase the price above a reasonable objective 
limit, even if they would have done it, in the end, the deal was to be signed at a smaller 
price than the superior limit agreed for the “losers” of the auction. Furthermore, the fact 
that EC gave examples where car manufacturers did not choose the price combination 
agreed in secret by the cartelists states as proof for the power to react of the car 
manufacturers against the so-called criminal actions of the cartel.   Andreas STAMATE 
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sold to car manufacturers, a spectacular increase in turnover for the companies 
involved in the cartel, the testimonials of car manufacturers, considered as 
victims of this cartel) which by this moment were not yet presented. They are 
extremely important if we accept the economic magnitude of the case.  
 
Table 2: The first two most powerful companies by turnover 
Year SAINT-GOBAIN(mil.euros)  PILKINGTON  (mil.euros) 
1993 10.906  - 
1994 11.357  - 
1995 10.719  - 
1996 13.931  - 
1997 16.324  - 
1998 17.821  3.622 
1999 22.952  3.367 
2000 28.815  3.359 
2001 30.390  3.419 
2002 30.274  3.370 
2003 29.590  3.292 
2004 32.172  3.328 
2005 35.110  - 
2006 41.596  - 
2007 43.421  - 
Source: Year of audited companies reports. 
 
The presented table illustrates a sort of normal distribution of the turnover over 
time in the case of Saint-Gobain, the leader of the cartel. Although the cartel was 
considered by the EC only between 1998 and 2003, we considered relevant a 
margin of +/- 4 years to observe the distribution of sales increases. As concerns 
Pilkington, it can be observed how year 1998 (the start point of the cartel) is the 
sole and the last year with high profits for it.  
The statistics prove the contrary of what EC states. In despite of organizing the 
cartel, which should suppose a better standard of profits for all the companies 
involved, Saint-Gobain is the only company with increasing turnovers. But this is 
not a proof for the successful leading of the cartel, because the increasing 
turnovers dated before the onset of the so-called cartel, on the one hand, and, 
on the other hand, increasing turnovers is not a guarantee for success in 
business; this can reveal a malpractice in coordination between members with  Free Competition Theory and the secret agreements 
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the prospect of disintegration of the cartel (Rothbard, 2004b, pp.644, Stamate, 
2009). Table 1 presents Saint-Gobain having a normal distribution over the years 
(1998-2003) of the market share (between 40-50%), but if we look at the official 
year reports we find a steady increase in turnover; the question is by what 
standard did EC measure Saint-Gobain market share? Any increase or freezing 
of the market share must be analyzed in relation to a given optimal standard. 
From the perspective of free competition theory, this standard is a subjective 
value of each company based on economic calculation and natural structure of 
market incentives, which cannot be determined by economists or outside 
observers. Also, Pilkington, contrary to what EC estimated (see Table 1) 
encountered an important decrease in turnover in the active period of the cartel, 
which normally could (should?) be interpreted also as a decrease in market 
share.  
 
Graph 1: Turnover evolution of the first two most powerful companies 
 
Cartelist’s testimonials to the accusation brought by EC 
Saint-Gobain considers that EC did not succeed to prove the existence of a 
coherent cartel plan in the field of European car glass market, although the  Andreas STAMATE 
 
18
company admits the existence of bilateral and trilateral meetings between the 
cartel members. In fact, Saint-Gobain does not admit the existence of a global 
centralized plan
1, because this would have to take into consideration the 
purchasing power of car manufacturers (in continual change) and also a 
functional mechanism for securing the market shares. The French company also 
argues that the evidence brought against it by the EC concerning price 
coordination and allocation of contracts at auctions is not sufficient per se to 
prove the existence of a cartel. To demonstrate the shaky foundation of the 
supposed cartel agreement, Saint-Gobain mentions that the practice of ‘covering 
each other’ in auctions is not a guarantee for success.  
Pilkington, the second most important company accused, holds that EC cannot 
practically prove the existence of the cartel. The company explains in a 
statement to EC that, even if the practices truly existed, either they were not 
implemented or they failed. “Pilkington claims that the Commission’s evidence is 
not credible, as it cannot sustain the funding of an infringement by reference to 
the standard of proof
2”. Also, Pilkington explains that the simple proof of the 
existence of a stable market share of the competitors does not reveal the 
existence of a secret agreement. Pilkington suggests that there are many 
practical difficulties to implement such an agreement. For example, for allocating 
contracts between competitors it needed a common effort of coordination of all 
industry key-elements, which fact the Commission did not prove.  
Final conclusions 
From the perspective of free competition theory the European car glass cartel 
raises two important problems. First is an ethical problem that concerns the 
normative support of competition public policy which gives power to EC to fine 
the companies that organize cartels and the second is an economic problem. 
Neither to the ethical nor to the economic problem does EC offer a coherent 
explanation. The nature of competition process is not only an economic issue. 
Peaceful economic cooperation between people or association of people can be 
a positive mean for many individuals who desire more goods and services, but 
still, not for all of them. The utilitarian approach to competition proves this fact.  
The European case of car glass cartel needed a review in the light of what we 
consider the best alternative to the present utilitarian approach, embraced by EC 
                                                        
1 EC decision, p. 114. 
2 EC decision, p. 121.  Free Competition Theory and the secret agreements 
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and many other economists. This was presented as the system of private 
property rights which is the only system favourable to economic calculation and, 
in the end, to economic prosperity. In fact, there can be no other social systems 
in the world but based on either exclusive private property rights (pure 
capitalism) or public or communal property (socialism). The idea of a third 
system, often mentioned by modern scientists or analysts as interventionism is a 
combination between the first two, but as Ludwig von Mises would say, always 
on the edge ready to fall into the realm of socialism (Mises, 1952, pp. 28). But as 
it was presented, the system of private property rights is an ethical system, 
because it argues for peaceful cooperation between individuals and incriminates 
aggression between them, thus considering this a good means for socially 
interacting. As we could see, the system of private property rights sets forth a 
natural structure of market incentives for entrepreneurs and gives them the 
opportunity to use economic calculation (in monetary terms) for deciding whether 
or not an investment is good or bad. By contrast, government intervention (in this 
case, EC) disrupts this order and creates unnatural and illegitimate incentives for 
the market participants. Thus they will respond to government incentives 
(artificially created by the public policy) instead of market natural incentives 
(based on the natural advantages discovered in time by the companies). 
Applying this theory to the present case, we can argue that EC extracted from 
Saint-Gobain, Pilkington, AGC and Soliver an amount of money which could be 
used by the four to invest more in production or any other thing (even leisure). 
With a lesser quantity of money, it is possible that companies lose some of their 
appetite to invest. Meanwhile, the car manufacturers can benefit if EC takes the 
risk of “losing” in auctions. On long term, this situation can lead to stagnation of 
innovation on the car glass market, thus leaving the consumers with lesser 
options. 
But we explained these arguments from the perspective of free competition 
theory, where there is no aggression until someone invades the property rights of 
others. This view is completely opposite to the mainstream neoclassical one, 
which decrees the perfect competition model as the best one to analyze the 
imperfections of a market or the market failures, and above that considers itself 
value free. Free competition theory must necessarily mean the absence of 
coercion and the right of private owners of resources to do whatever they need 
as long as this does not affect in a measurable or objective way the property of 
others.  Andreas STAMATE 
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